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Abstract 
Shankara’s Advaita Vedanta has been very influential in India, both as a well-articulated 
philosophical system and a weighty theological position. However, Advaita’s supposedly 
dismissive attitude toward the world always remained its Achilles’ heel. Thinkers whose 
sympathies lie firmly with Advaita are at pains to give a philosophically satisfactory 
explanation of the ontological status of the world. This article briefly discusses the efforts 
and resultant views of four such contemporary thinkers – K.C. Bhattacharyya, S. 
Radhakrishnan, P.T. Raju, and Richard De Smet.  
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1. The problematic of the world in Advaita Vedanta 
 
During the entire 20th century, Advaita Vedanta was the single most influential philosophy 
in India. This was due in part to its endorsement by western Indologists like Max Mueller 
and Paul Deussen in the late 19th and early 20th century. However, Advaita’s supposedly, or 
allegedly, dismissive attitude toward the world always remained its Achilles’ heel, especially 
in the contemporary period when the empirical world has been given significant  
[page 294] philosophical and scientific importance. It is no easy task for any Advaitin to give 
an adequate world-affirming interpretation of Advaita, given that the system dismisses all 
distinctions as ontologically impossible and that the system was repeatedly dubbed maya-
vada (theory of illusion) and crypto-Buddhism by its adversaries.1   
The Advaita doctrine as epitomized in Shankara’s Brahmasutra-bhashya presents a 
robust form of monistic idealism.2 On the authority of the Upanishads, the Brahma-sutra, 
                                                          
1 See S. M. Srinivasa Chari, Fundamentals of Visistadvaita Vedanta: A Study Based on Vedanta Desika’s Tattva-
mukta-kalapa (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988), 5; Hajime Nakamura, A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy, 
vol. 1 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989), 121, 459; Sengaku Mayeda, “Sankara and Buddhism,” in New 
Perspectives on Advaita Vedanta: Essays in Commemoration of Professor Richard De Smet, ed. Bradley J. 
Malkovsky (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 18-19. 
2 By scholarly consensus, the Brahmasutra-bhashya is considered the most authentic work of Shankara. The 
Shankarite authorship of the Upadeshasahasri, the Brihadaranyaka-bhashya, and the Taittiriya-bhashya is 
also generally accepted. See Karl H. Potter, ed., Advaita Vedanta up to Samkara and His Pupils, vol. 3 of The 
Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 115-16. 
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and the Mandukya-karika, Shankara accepted Brahman as the absolute truth about reality. 
If Brahman is the sole reality, the reality of the world has to be toned down. Shankara 
explained the world in terms of illusion (maya) and superimposition (adhyasa). 
The world for Advaita is an illusory appearance of Brahman and the world’s ontological 
status as real is only an erroneous superimposition on Brahman. In the classic rope-snake 
example, the illusory snake is superimposed on the rope. Until the discrimination between 
the rope and the snake takes place, the snake is regarded as real, on account of the reality of 
the rope. Similarly, when discriminatory knowledge (vidya) arises, you realize that all 
differences are unreal and reality is ultimately non-dual (advaita). This non-dual reality of 
your higher experience is Brahman, and the world of your empirical experience, which is 
Brahman’s appearance, is only apparently real. Advaita explains away all empirical 
experience and knowledge as ultimately your erroneous superimposition on Brahman. A 
well-known epigram attributed to Shankara captures the gist of Advaita: “Brahman is real, 
the world is unreal, and the individual self is identical to Brahman.”3  
We discuss briefly the views of four academic philosophers of Advaitic leanings, who 
tried to give some reinterpretations to Advaita, so it can better and more positively account 
for the world of our empirical and human experiences. K.C. Bhattacharyya (1875-1949), S. 
Radhakrishnan (1888-1975), P.T. Raju (1904-92), and Richard De Smet (1916-97) are chosen 
for their long- 
[page 295]standing stability in the Advaitic tradition and their divergent readings of that 
very same tradition. 
 
2.1. K.C. Bhattacharyya  
 
Bhattacharyya tried to understand Vedanta in light of Kant and Hegel, and Kant and Hegel 
in light of Vedanta.4 From Kant he learnt the importance of the rational, ethical and aesthetic 
aspects of human subjectivity, and from Hegel, the dialectic of the Absolute. But at the same 
time he rejected the Kantian agnosticism about the transcendent (noumenon) and the 
Hegelian absolutization of the Absolute.  
Bhattacharyya disagreed with the Kantian thesis that the Transcendent (the Self) as a 
thing-in-itself is not knowable to theoretical reason but is accepted only as an object of moral 
faith (practical reason). He classified epistemological objects into speakables, thinkables, and 
knowables. All speakables are knowables, but not all knowables are thinkables. The Self is 
speakable, though inadequately, but not thinkable using empirical categories. Even as the 
Self is not thinkable empirically (intellectively), it can be known transcendentally 
(intuitively).5   
Different levels of human consciousness are involved in understanding different 
speakables. At the level of empirical consciousness, the objects of our knowing are empirical 
facts. Such abstract concepts as universals, life, and mind are the objects of pure objective 
consciousness. The ego-sense, the awareness of my empirical (psychological) self, constitutes 
subjective consciousness. The highest level or form of consciousness is transcendental 
consciousness. Here the object of our knowing is the inner Self (the Absolute), known 
                                                          
3 In verse 20 of the Brahma-jnanavali-mala, a non-Shankarite work of later period, we read, “Brahma satyam, 
jaganmithya, jivo Brahmaiva naparah.” 
4 For Bhattacharyya’s writings, see Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, ed. Gopinath 
Bhattacharyya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2008). 
5 For an Advaita Vedantin, knowledge (vidya) is the paramount way toward the summum bonum, namely the 
Brahma-sakshatkara (Self-realization). 
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intuitively.6 At the empirical level, which is the level of science, speaking is literal and the 
aim is to get information about the world. At the other three levels, which are the levels of 
philosophy, the speaking is symbolic and the aim is to find the meaning of our experience. 
Related to the levels of consciousness are the three levels of self-realization (realization 
of our subjectivity). In bodily subjectivity, we identify our self with the body; in psychic 
subjectivity, the self is identified with the mind; and in pure subjectivity, the self is realized 
as freedom (freedom from all objectivity), the Absolute.  
The Absolute as pure subjectivity is devoid of all objectivity. In this regard, 
Bhattacharyya believed that the concept of maya is indispensable  
[page 296] to the Shankarite monism and its understanding of the world. The reality of 
cosmic maya, the world, and our experience of it is akin to the illusory snake in the rope-
snake example. The illusory snake is experienced in three stages, according to 
Bhattacharyya. In the first stage the snake is believed to be real. In the second stage this 
belief is corrected and we come to know the snake is unreal. In the third stage we know the 
snake is unreal at all times, both now and at the time we perceived it as real. Like the snake 
in the third stage, maya is neither existent nor non-existent but absolute nought. Both its 
appearance and its retraction are unreal.  
Bhattacharyya’s most remarkable idea is his notion of the Absolute as alternation. 
Instead of the Hegelian absolutization of the Absolute, he chose the dialectics of alternation 
both at transcendental and empirical levels of reality. The triple functions of consciousness 
in relation to its contents are: knowing, feeling, and willing. Each of them has its own 
formulation of the Absolute, namely truth, value, and freedom respectively. When cognition 
is given importance, the Absolute is viewed as truth; when emotion (devotion) is given 
importance, it is viewed as value; and when volition is given importance, it is viewed as 
freedom. These conceptions of the Absolute cannot be unified into one, because each is 
Absolute in turn.7 For Bhattacharyya, this alternation is not just our symbolic speaking 
about the one Absolute in three distinct ways, but the very constitution (dynamics) of the 
Absolute.8   
 
2.2. S. Radhakrishnan 
 
Radhakrishnan tried to make Vedanta, especially the Shankara Vedanta, more appealing and 
meaningful to the modern mind.9 Besides Advaita, his principal source of philosophizing, 
Radhakrishnan made use of ideas from Western idealism, modern science, Christianity, and 
Buddhism. 
Radhakrishnan was a devoted defender of religion and spirituality against the 
challenges of modern science. In his philosophy, it is hard to distinguish between 
philosophical thinking and religious thinking. As against the usual understanding of 
intellectual reflection (discursive reasoning) as the method of philosophy, he proposed 
                                                          
6 From the advaitic (non-dualistic) point of view, this intuitive knowing of the Self is nothing but the Self (the 
Absolute) knowing itself. 
7 This gives reason and legitimacy to philosophical and religious pluralism. 
8 If the alternation (alternation of truth, value, and freedom) itself is constitutive of the Absolute is an open 
question, however. Cf. Gopinath Bhattacharyya, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, 
xliii. The similarity appears not so much to the Hegelian dialectic as to the Kantian notion of triple-reason (pure 
reason, practical reason, and aesthetic reason). 
9 For Radhakrishnan’s philosophical views, see mainly his An Idealist View of Life (1932, 1937) and the 
introduction to his The Brahma Sutra: The Philosophy of Spiritual Life (1960). 
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intuition as the method. While science describes the empirical world, philosophy interprets 
and explains the ultimate nature,  
[page 297] meaning, and purpose of the universe by intuitive knowledge. The intuitive 
apprehension (understanding) provides us with immediate, personal experience of reality. 
This intuitive apprehension is the very activity of the spirit within us.  
The idealist view of life and reality, which Radhakrishnan calls religion of the spirit, 
perceives the universe as ultimately spiritual. Brahman (Atman/ the Spirit) being the 
ultimate truth and the universe its self-manifestation, the spirit is our deepest self. 
Radhakrishnan wanted all historical religions to transform themselves into the religion of 
the spirit, a spiritual vision that transforms the world and ensures human unity, universal 
moral order, and world peace.  
Radhakrishnan tried to work out a positive account of the world by interfacing three 
concepts – Brahman (the Absolute), Ishvara (God), and the world.  Brahman considered in 
its self-identity as pure consciousness is beyond all distinctions, qualifications, and 
descriptions. This one, absolute being, however, manifests itself as the world. The world is 
just one possibility of Brahman’s self-manifestation; other possibilities we may not know. 
Brahman in its relation to the world is Ishvara (God). Ishvara is Brahman’s creative aspect, 
conceived as creator, redeemer, and judge. Immanent in the world, Ishvara guides and 
transforms it. Ishvara lasts as long as the world-process lasts.  
Although the transformation of the world is God’s action, it is essentially linked with 
human transformation. Despite limitations, human evolution and progress is teleological 
and moves toward a greater good.10 Human calling is to co-operate with the divine plan for 
the world’s transformation. Typical of an Advaitin, Radhakrishnan held that our deepest self 
(atman) is identical to the transcendental Self (Atman) and is above transmigration. What is 
subject to transmigration is jiva, the empirical self. The world-process lasts until all jivas are 
liberated.11 When all jivas are liberated, the world will be transformed into Brahma-loka (the 
kingdom of God). The world and all jivas become one with God and God will be all in all. 
And finally the Brahma-loka, along with Ishvara, will lapse into Brahman. Thus Brahman 
remains the beginning and the end of the world. If and when another world-process begins is 
left to the freedom of Brahman. 
 
2.3. P.T. Raju 
 
Raju’s entire philosophizing revolved around the concept of I-am.12 The uppercase I-AM 
stands for the supreme Self (Brahman) and the lowercase  
[page 298] I-am for the individual self (atman). The latter is the gateway by which we access 
the former. The philosophy of I-am, according to Raju, accounts for the Vedantic doctrine of 
the transcendence and immanence of the spirit. 
My existence is fundamentally an I-am experience, as my existence (am-ness) and 
consciousness (self-awareness) are united in it. I-am experience is self-evident, as it does not 
require any external proof. In my I-am experience, I am directly aware of my am-ness. It is 
on this fundamental I-am experience that all other experiences are founded. The philosophy 
of I-am thus forms the foundation for a philosophy of life. 
                                                          
10 According to Radhakrishnan, regress rebirth is a remote possibility. For human beings there may not be a going 
back to sub-human levels. 
11 Meanwhile, the liberated jivas take birth as bodhisattvas (jivan-muktas) for the benefit of humanity. 
12 For Raju’s philosophical views, see mainly his Spirit, Being, and Self (1982) and sections on “General Estimate 
and Constructive Comment” in his Structural Depths of Indian Thought (1985). 
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I-am is involved in all my cognitive activities. All my mental activities presuppose the 
existence of a dynamic I. I cannot meaningfully make even a simple statement like “This is a 
pen,” if I am not aware that I am aware of a pen. In this regard, Raju draws a distinction 
between I-am (ontological self) and I-think (empirical or phenomenological self). The former 
continues and the latter changes. The latter is an aggregate of psychological experiences and 
the former is the synthesizer of this aggregate. The empirical self undergoes changes, but the 
ontological self endures through these changes. My ontological self is involved in all my 
activities, and yet transcends them all. Without a dynamic self to synthesize our experiences, 
we cannot experience the world. It is the ontological self in us that organizes our empirical 
experiences into time, space, and causality.13   
If my existence is fundamentally an I-am experience, the Supreme Being must also be 
an I-AM experience. The argument is from unity of being. Being (is-ness) is the same for all 
entities. The difference is only in how this one being is manifested. A horse and a human are 
ontologically (in is-ness aspect) same, but phenomenologically different. The source from 
which all is-ness derives is the supreme I-AM. The world has no is-ness of its own, apart 
from that of Brahman. On the question of how the world of objectivity comes out of 
Brahman, which is pure subjectivity, Raju would say the world does not come out of 
Brahman directly, but from its power (shakti). The world comes out of Brahman’s shakti and 
is absorbed back to Brahman through the same shakti. In other words, the world is the 
transformation of Brahman’s power, rather than of Brahman itself.14 Brahman and its power 
are nonetheless inseparable, like fire and its power to burn.  
The world, for Raju, is very much real and it cannot be dismissed as illusion 
(maya/mithya). The world is said to be illusory or unreal only at the 
[page 299] higher level, where it is contrasted to Brahman, who is the ontological source of 
all existents. The word maya, in fact, should be taken in its etymological meaning. According 
to Raju, the word maya is derived from the verbal root ma, meaning “to measure.” The 
world is called maya, because it is “measured” in time and space, in contrast to Brahman 
that cannot be measured.  
And coming to the question whether the individual I-am (atman) is identical to the 
supreme I-AM (Brahman), Raju seems to neither affirm nor deny it. He would rather say 
they are ontologically the same, because the being of my I-am is derived from the supreme I-
AM. So it may be said that my I-am is inherently infinite and essentially one with I-AM. 
Moreover, for me my I-am is the gateway to the supreme I-AM. I can know and experience I-
AM only as my I-am.  
 
2.4. Richard De Smet  
 
The Belgian-born Indian philosopher Richard De Smet tried to give a Christian, or rather 
Thomistic, reading to Shankara’s non-dualism by interpreting Brahman as the non-dual 
substantive (existence-giving) cause, standing in a non-reciprocal relation to the universe.15  
The Brahman of Advaita, the non-qualified Brahman, has usually been taken to be 
impersonal, in contrast with the personal God (the qualified Brahman) of other Vedantic 
                                                          
13 Raju is not denying the objective reality of time, space, and causality. Rather, the point is to underscore the 
importance of ontological self, I-am. 
14 In “Transcendence and Historicity in the Self as Atman” (Idealistic Studies 20 [1990]: 203-29), Raju speaks of 
three forms this transformation: God (Ishvara), subtle cosmic from (Hiranyagarbha), and gross cosmic form 
(Virat). 
15 For De Smet’s writings, see Richard De Smet, Brahman and Person, ed. Ivo Coelho (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 
2010); Richard De Smet, Understanding Sankara, ed. Ivo Coelho (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2013). 
6 
 
schools. But De Smet would argue that personality (personhood) is applicable to the non-
qualified (nirguna) Brahman of Advaita as well.16 The concept of “person” signifies the 
ultimate subject of attribution of intellectual activities like knowledge and consciousness. If 
pure consciousness is the defining characteristic of Brahman, the non-dual Brahman can 
also be referred to as person, indeed a super-person. 
Regarding the Advaitic view of the world, De Smet would hold that Shankara’s 
philosophy is not illusionistic and acosmic. The notion of maya implies not so much the 
negation of the world as the affirmation of Brahman who is the substantive cause of the 
world. On the level of ordinary speaking, both the world and its substantive cause (Brahman) 
are beings.17 But Brahman transcends its effects so immensely, that compared with Brahman 
the universe is considered unreal (maya). The being of the world is only a participation 
[page 300] in the being of Brahman, and as a participated being, the world is ultimately non-
being.18  
De Smet further interprets the meaning of Shankara’s “advaita” (non-dualism) as 
“tadatmya” (identity) of non-reciprocal nature. As non-reciprocal relation, tadatmya is 
having Tat (That, i.e. Brahman) as one’s own atman, inner being. What it means is that 
Brahman is the substantive cause of one’s being.19 Tadatmya is not unique to the individual 
self (atman) alone, but it imbues all effects of Brahman. Brahman, being the substantive 
(existence-giving) cause of the universe, is the innermost self of every entity. All things have 
their self, their being, in Brahman, but Brahman has not its self in them. Thus the non-
duality implied by tadatmya, at both individual and cosmic levels, does not eliminate 
distinctions, but only underscores the pervading causal presence of Brahman, immanent in 
all things and at the same time transcendent.  
 
3. Observations and comments  
The philosophers we discussed above have provided diverse views as to how we can better 
understand Advaita’s take on the ontological status of the world in relation to Brahman. 
Here the question of who remained more faithful to the Advaitic tradition is immaterial. As 
creative thinkers, they took the freedom of philosophizing, and hence their different 
interpretations. Even as remaining committed to classical Advaita in their own way, they 
critiqued that very same tradition to make it more relevant and meaningful in contemporary 
times.  
Out of the four, Bhattacharyya is stronger and more focussed in the analysis of human 
subjectivity at its various levels. But he appears lacking in his analysis of the world. This does 
                                                          
16 According to De Smet, Brahman is called nirguna not because it is impersonal or without qualities, but because 
its qualities are identical to itself. Brahman’s nirgunatva is here considered as analogous to the Thomistic notion 
of divine simplicity.  
17 “On the level of ordinary language, creaturely effects and their Cause are beings (sat), are imbued with 
existence (satta)” (De Smet, Understanding Sankara, 377). 
18 Here the Thomistic idea of participation, i.e. creatures participate in God’s being, is at the back of De Smet’s 
mind. 
19 Unlike a reciprocal relation, the two terms (here Brahman and atman) are not interchangeable in a non-
reciprocal relation. In order to substantiate his view, De Smet appeals to the analogy of the face and its reflection 
(in the mirror) discussed in Upadeshasahasri, chapter 2.18. Just as a face is reflected in a mirror, the Self is 
reflected in the ego (the empirical self) and makes it appear like the Self. De Smet takes this to imply that the 
individual self is a reflection (image) of the supreme Self and thus in tadatmya relation with it. It seems that De 
Smet has taken here a view different than what the chapter in question originally meant. The original import of 
part 2, chapter 18 of the Upadeshasahasri was to show “that” and “thou” in “that art thou” express the same 
reality (see US 2.18.170-71).  
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not mean that Bhattacharyya is dismissive of the word as total maya. His philosophy is not 
without some inherent potential to give a positive account of the world. The first two levels 
human consciousness, namely empirical consciousness and pure objective consciousness, do 
not make sense without reference to the real world. Nor can we explain bodily subjectivity 
and psychic subjectivity without taking into consideration the world of our empirical 
experience. And his idea of the triple-absolute, the Absolute as truth, freedom, and value 
alternatively, is apparently  
[page 301] the prototype of the three subjective functions – knowing, willing, and feeling – 
we perform in relation to the world of our everyday experience.  
Unlike Bhattacharyya, Radhakrishnan attempted at constructing a grand metaphysical 
narrative after the manner of Western idealists like Kant and Hegel.20 He tried to bring into 
his system all aspects of reality we experience – religious, empirical and scientific, and 
ethical. The world for Radhakrishnan is very much real and it cannot be underrated as 
illusion. The world, however, is called maya because of its temporal (passing) character. The 
world is being, for it exists for a time; the world is non-being, for it does not exist for all 
times. Brahman is the only being that exists for all times, and it is the substratum of all other 
forms of existence. So we may say the world as maya is neither real nor unreal. 
Radhakrishnan’s real explainer of the world is not maya but his Ishvara concept though. He 
presented Ishvara as the connecting link between Brahman (pure subjectivity) and the world 
(objectivity), thus keeping his idealist view of reality compatible with a realist view of the 
world. Ishvara is the creative aspect of Brahman. Endowed with the creative power of maya, 
Ishvara will endure as long as the world-process continues. Ishvara is Brahman immanent in 
the world and becoming its organizer and guide. Ishvara is not Brahman just looked at in 
relation to the world, as commonly understood, but rather the very first phase of Brahman’s 
unfolding.  
Raju shared many of his philosophical views with Radhakrishnan, as both were 
interested in defending a grand idealist view of life. In the later part of his philosophical 
career, however, Raju narrowed down his reflections to a single unifying concept, namely I-
am. He used the concept of I-am as the hermeneutic key to interpret and understand reality 
at different levels. In I-am, consciousness and existence meet and merge into a single entity. 
This becomes the basis of the Advaitic view of reality. Brahman, atman, and the world are 
different levels of I-am existence and experience. At the subjective individual level, reality is 
experienced as my enduring self, my I-am. In my self-transcendence, the supreme Self is 
experienced as I-AM. The world of objectivity (I-think) may be out there, but I cannot 
experience or comprehend it without linking it to my I-am, so much so that I can say my I-
am is conferring existence on the world. Here Raju is not denying the objective existence of 
the world but only trying to explain the ontological and epistemological link that exists 
between subjectivity (the self) and objectivity (the world). It is ultimately the supreme I-AM 
that confers existence on the world, which is the modification of its creative energy 
(shakti/maya). 
[page 302] While Bhattacharyya, Radhakrishnan, and Raju philosophized from within 
one main tradition, De Smet did his thinking from within two, namely Advaita and 
Thomism. On the one hand it put some constraint on his interpretation of Advaita, but on 
the other it provided him with an opportunity to explore a new line of reflection. He argued 
                                                          
20 But owing to syncretic style and idea overload in his writings, it can sometimes be hard to identify his definitive 
position on a specific problem. As for his views on the ontological character of the world, however, we have relied 
primarily on the final chapter of his An Idealist View of Life and his introduction to The Brahma Sutra: The 
Philosophy of Spiritual Life. 
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that the Brahman of Shankara can also be viewed as a person, granted that consciousness is 
the hallmark of personality. For De Smet the ultimate truth about “advaita” is that Brahman 
is the substantive cause, inherent in all beings. As the source of all being, Brahman is the 
only reality. As to the ontological status of the individual self and the world, theirs is only a 
participated existence. What is denied by Advaita is not their reality but their independent 
reality. They are ontologically dependent on Brahman, who De Smet sees as eminently 
personal in nature and the object of intellectual contemplation and love. On the whole, De 
Smet’s interpretation of Advaita may have been greatly influenced by Thomism, but his 
philosophy as creative cross-cultural philosophizing is a case in point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
